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FAIR HOUSING LAWS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
ROOMMATE SEEKERS
By
Chris A. Kolosov*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a biracial, heterosexual, female Buddhist, new
to Los Angeles and looking for a place to live. Short of money,
she notes the following roommate-wanted ads:
1. We are three Christian females… We have weekly
bible studies and bi-weekly times of fellowship.1
2. The person applying for the room MUST be a
BLACK GAY MALE.2
3. This is a Christian home and we are looking for a
Christian female to rent a downstairs room.3
She is unwelcome in at least two of the apartments, but
each ad is presumptively illegal. Fair housing laws prohibit discrimination based on religion, race, sex and, in some jurisdictions, sexual orientation.4 The federal Fair Housing Act
(“FHA”) and many state statutes and municipal ordinances exempt “Mrs. Murphy”5 landlords, who rent out rooms or apartments in smaller buildings where they reside. These landlords
can usually discriminate when selecting tenants, so long as they
do not advertise preferences or state discriminatory reasons for
rejecting applicants.6 In most states, these exemptions apply to
roommate-seekers, but some jurisdictions are more restrictive.7
Further, the Supreme Court has held that the Civil Rights Act of
18668 prohibits racial discrimination and many forms of national
origin discrimination in housing,9 and several lower courts have
concluded that the FHA does not preclude claims under the 1866
Act.10 Thus, both Mrs. Murphy landlords and roommate seekers
could be held liable for refusing to rent to people who are protected under the 1866 Act.
Today, people seeking roommates outnumber classic
Mrs. Murphy landlords,11 but, despite the distinct compatibility
concerns involved, fair housing laws do not acknowledge this
group as a separate category. Whereas boarding house owners
may impose rules upon tenants,12 compatibility is particularly
important to roommates as their conflicts are typically resolved
through discussion and compromise. Many landlords who enjoy
the Mrs. Murphy exemptions merely rent out separate apartments in buildings where they also reside. In this article, I explore whether fair housing laws violate the intimate association,
privacy, and free speech rights of people seeking roommates to
share their kitchens, bathrooms, and other common living areas.
I examine three types of laws: prohibitions on using discriminatory criteria when selecting a roommate, prohibitions on placing
discriminatory advertisements, and prohibitions on making discriminatory statements when interviewing potential candidates.
In Part II, I describe several adjudications in the roommate context, including cases brought against Internet sites that
provide forums and matching services for roommate seekers. In
Part III, I examine laws that bar discriminatory selection and
conclude that federal intimate association and privacy rights, as
well as privacy rights granted by the California constitution, are
violated if individuals do not have a completely free choice in
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selecting a roommate. In Part IV, I analyze advertising restrictions from both an intimate associate and privacy perspective
and under the commercial speech doctrine. I determine that,
although such restrictions survive intimate association and privacy challenges, only restrictions on discriminatory ads related
to race, ethnicity or national origin survive a free speech challenge. In Part V, I explain why prohibitions on discriminatory
statements are even more problematic, violating free speech,
privacy and intimate association rights. I conclude that, while it
is wise policy to allow roommate seekers greater leeway in advertising some preferences, restrictions on ads expressing preferences related to race, national origin and ethnicity are not only
constitutional, they are likely to advance the goals of the Fair
Housing Act.

II. THE ADJUDICATION OF ROOMMATE
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Agency commissioners, and state and federal judges,
have adjudicated cases brought by rebuffed roommate applicants. A brief survey of a few such cases provides context for
the constitutional rights discussion that follows.13
1. PROHIBITIONS ON DISCRIMINATORY ROOMMATE
SELECTION AND STATEMENTS
In Department of Fair Employment and Housing v.
Larrick,14 two Caucasian women were seeking a third roommate
“to share their unit and help pay the rent.”15 During a phone conversation, one of the women told a bi-racial applicant that her
other roommate did not want to live with a black person. The
roommate seekers were found liable16 for discriminating on the
basis of race and for making racially discriminatory statements.
None of the exceptions to California’s Fair Housing code applied to the respondents because more than one roomer or
boarder lived in the dwelling.17
In Marya v. Slakey,18 an applicant sued the owner of a
six-bedroom house after a co-tenant discriminated against her.
The tenants executed a single lease and advertised and filled
vacancies after one-on-one interviews. Decisions on which candidate to select had to be unanimous, and all tenants had to be
non-smoking, vegetarian students. One tenant declined to interview the applicant, explaining that two Indian women already
lived in the house, and he did not want to live “with three people
of the same cultural orientation.”19 The applicant alleged she
had been denied housing on the basis of her race, color, national
origin and/or sex.20 The court held that the Mrs. Murphy exemption did not apply and would not have permitted discriminatory statements in any case. The court did not conclude that the
roommates were entitled to any special protections when creating criteria for cohabitants.21
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2. PROHIBITION ON DISCRIMINATORY ROOMMATE SELECTION
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reviewed a local ordinance prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in Sprague v. City of Madison.22 Two roommates extended
an offer to a lesbian but later withdrew it, stating that they were
not comfortable living with her. The court held that the ordinance unambiguously applied in all housing rentals and rejected
the appellants’ argument that it was unconstitutional in the
roommate context: “Appellants gave up their unqualified right to
such constitutional protections when they rented housing for
profit.”23 Subsequent to commencement of the case, Madison’s
City Council had amended the ordinance24 to exempt roommates, but the court nonetheless held the defendants liable.25
The court’s conclusion that the solicitation of co-roommates
constitutes “renting housing for profit,” and that renters who do
so forfeit their privacy and First Amendment rights, may mean
that people who lack the resources to live alone are particularly
at risk of facing infringements on their constitutional rights.
3. PROHIBITIONS ON STATEMENTS/ADVERTISEMENTS
EXPRESSING PREFERENCES

4. PERMITTING SEXUAL ORIENTATION
DISCRIMINATION
The commissioners in Department of Fair Employment
and Housing v. Baker36 concluded that California’s statute prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination did not apply to a
roommate seeker. The respondent rejected a lesbian applicant
via voicemail, stating his other roommate was a Christian Fundamentalist, and they “would not get along too well.”37 The
commissioners explained that sexual orientation discrimination
was incorporated into California fair housing law through the
Unruh Civil Rights Act,38 which applies only to “business establishments,”39 and “does not apply to those relationships that are
truly private.”40 They further stated “truly private and social
relationships” are protected by the right of intimate association,
and held that the record did not reveal whether the respondent’s
housemate relationship “was sufficiently non-continuous, nonpersonal and non-social to preclude being a constitutionally protected intimate association.”41 The facts were thus insufficient
to show that his “housing operation constituted a ‘business establishment’ rather than a constitutionally protected intimate
association.”42

In Department of Fair Employment and Housing v.
5. CASES AGAINST INTERNET FORUMS OR ROOMDeSantis, a woman renter sought a roommate to share her twoMATE SEARCH SERVICE PROVIDERS
bedroom apartment “to help pay the rent.” 26 An African AmeriIn Chicago Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under
can male potential renter stated that the advertised room was too
small, and asked to see the other bedroom. The woman refused, Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,43 a public interest consortium alindicating it was her room. The applicant later claimed that she leged that it had diverted substantial time and resources away
told him no room was available, and that she had denied him the from its fair housing program responding to Craigslist’s publicarental due to his race. A housingtion of discriminatory classified ads.44
rights group sent one Caucasian and
Many ads appeared to have been
one African American tester to the
placed by roommate seekers.45 The
apartment. The respondent told the
court held that Craigslist was afforded
Caucasian tester that she “really
by the Communications
The Court’s decision may mean that immunity
[doesn’t] like black guys. I try to be
Decency Act (CDA),46 under which
fair and all, but they scare me.”27 She people who lack the resources to live providers of an interactive computer
was legally permitted to discriminate alone are particularly at risk of fac- service are not to be treated as the
publisher of information created by
in selecting a roommate under California’s single roomer exemption, but ing infringements on their constitu- another content provider. Because
Craigslist served only “as a conduit”
was held liable for making a discrimitional rights.
for information provided by its users,
natory statement.28
it was not liable for ads that violated
In Fair Housing Advocates
fair housing laws.47 Roommate seekAssociation v. McGlynn,29 a black
female responded to an ad seeking a
ers who place discriminatory ads may
female roommate placed by a white
nonetheless be held individually liable
male. After inquiring about her race, he told her “blacks should as the content providers. Although the court’s analysis focused
live with blacks and whites should live with whites.”30 A fair on the CDA, in affirming the decision of the district court, the
housing organization then had testers contact the respondent.31 Seventh Circuit hinted at the constitutional rights issues raised
His behavior suggested he may have been seeking not just room- by the case, stating: “[A]ny rule that forbids truthful advertising
mate, but a girlfriend.32 He asked a black tester about her occu- of a transaction that would be substantively lawful encounters
pation, if she smoked or drank, if she had a boyfriend and why serious problems under the First Amendment.”48
she was not living with him, and if it would bother her that he
An online roommate matching service was similarly
was a white smoker who drank.33 He invited her to the apart- sued in Fair Housing Council v. Roommate.com,49 but with a
ment, but she left after he asked her if she wanted a massage and very different outcome. Subscribers to the service respond to
then asked for a kiss.34 The respondent was found liable for questionnaires by selecting answers in drop-down menus.50 The
placing a discriminatory ad and for making discriminatory state- Ninth Circuit concluded that “By requiring subscribers to proments.35
vide the information as a condition of accessing its service, and
by providing a limited set of pre-populated answers, Roommate
becomes much more than a passive transmitter of information
provided by others; it becomes the developer, at least in part, of
that information.”51 The Court thus remanded the case for a
4
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determination as to whether Roommate’s publication of certain
postings violates the FHA, “or whether they are protected by the
First Amendment or other constitutional guarantees.”52

III. OUTRIGHT BANS ON DISCRIMINATION
1. FEDERAL INTIMATE ASSOCIATION AND PRIVACY RIGHTS
AND DISCRIMINATORY SELECTION
In Roberts v. Jaycees, the Supreme Court suggested
that the Fourteenth Amendment right to intimate association
encompasses roommate relationships, explaining that “highly
personal relationships” are protected because “individuals draw
much of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others.”53 Though the Supreme Court specifically identified family
relationships, the Court imagined other relationships would be
similarly protected:
Family relationships, by their nature, involve
deep attachments and commitments to the
necessarily few other individuals with whom
one shares not only a special community of
thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also
distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.
Among other things, therefore, they are distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions
to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the
relationship. As a general matter only relationships with theses sorts of qualities are
likely to reflect the considerations that have
led to an understanding of freedom of association as an intrinsic element of personal liberty.54
The identification of “selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation” underscores that relationships beyond blood
ties are protected. Because people cannot choose their families,
if only familial relationships were protected, identifying
“selectivity in decisions to begin” the association as a criterion
for determining whether a relationship is protected would be
incongruous. Roommate relationships, in particular, are characterized by each of the three factors identified by the Court in
Roberts. They are small, usually including no more individuals
than there are bedrooms in a dwelling. Most people are quite
selective when deciding to live with another person—they are
choosing someone who will have access to their possessions,
pets and personal information. And roommate relationships are
highly secluded. Roommates often see each other in their pajamas or underwear, and when they are sick, exhausted, or just
sad. People often hide from the rest of the world aspects of
themselves that are unavoidably revealed in the privacy of the
home.55
Thus, denying the right to choose cohabitants based on
personal criteria profoundly violates personal liberty, and fair
housing laws that ban discrimination outright should be subjected to strict scrutiny’s least restrictive means test. Yet, as
“liberty and autonomy” mean little if individuals are powerless
to decide with whom to create intimate relationships,56 no means
of combating housing discrimination could be more restrictive.
Special - Fall 2008

Prohibiting discriminatory selection only when housing is not
shared is a reasonable alternative because the result would likely
be the same. Because a roommate seeker may consider many
factors—compatible schedules, similar tastes in music or television—she can state many reasons for rejecting an applicant,
even if consciously or unconsciously her motivation is discriminatory preference. Furthermore, the exemption of Mrs. Murphy
landlords from all but the advertising and statement prohibitions
illustrates Congress’s belief that certain privacy interests are
important enough to justify some sacrifice of the FHA’s goals.57
Eliminating roommate choice is thus unlikely to pass the leastrestrictive-means test.
Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas58 has nonetheless led
some to conclude that federal intimate association and privacy
rights do not protect roommates.59 Six students challenged a
zoning ordinance limiting the occupancy of single-family dwellings to traditional families or to groups of not more than two
unrelated persons. The Court determined that the ordinance did
not compromise any fundamental right to association or privacy.
However, a zoning ordinance that prohibits groups of people
from living in certain areas is quite different from a law that
affirmatively requires an individual to accept a cohabitant. The
former only affects where people in an existing relationship may
live, but the latter determines with whom an individual must
create a relationship, at least if she cannot afford to live alone or
would prefer to have a roommate.60
In Carey v. Brown,61 the Supreme Court stressed the
importance of residential privacy: “The States’ interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is
certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.”62
The Court continued, “Preserving the sanctity of the home, the
one retreat to which men and women can repair to escape the
tribulations of their daily pursuits, is surely an important
value.”63 Not only has the Court chosen to protect residential
privacy,64 it has recognized privacy within the home as a constitutional right.65 The range of contexts in which the right has
been recognized suggests that it includes autonomy in determining the person roommate seekers are likely to greet first in the
morning and see last at day’s end.
2. PRIVACY RIGHTS GRANTED UNDER THE CALIFORNIA
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS THAT PREVENT SEEKERS
FROM ULTIMATELY SELECTING ROOMMATES
At least nine state constitutions provide privacy protections more expansive than those afforded federally.66 In City of
Santa Barbara v. Adamson,67 the California Supreme Court concluded that California’s privacy right68 protects roommate relationships when it struck down a zoning ordinance prohibiting
more than five unrelated persons from living together. The Court
described the plaintiffs: 69
They chose to reside with each other when
Adamson made it known she was looking for
congenial people with whom to share her
house. Since then, they explain, they have
become a close group with social, economic
and psychological commitments to each
other . . . they have chosen to live together
mainly because of their compatibility. . . . Appellants say that they regard their group as ‘a
family’ and that they seek to share several
5

values of conventionally composed families.
A living arrangement like theirs concededly
does achieve many of the personal and practical needs served by traditional family living.70
The Court concluded that California’s right to privacy encompassed the right to live with whomever one wishes, and Santa
Barbara would have to show a compelling public interest in restricting communal living.71 The highest Courts of New Jersey
and New York have concluded that similar zoning laws violated
state constitutional privacy or due process protections.72
The three part test for invasions of privacy announced
by the California Supreme Court in Hill v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association73 suggests that roommate relationships are
protected beyond the zoning context and that roommate seekers
should have autonomy in selecting cohabitants. If a plaintiff
establishes: “(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3)
conduct by [the] defendant constituting a serious invasion of
privacy,” the defendant must show that the invasion substantively furthers a countervailing interest.74 The plaintiff may rebut that defendant’s assertion by showing there are alternatives
with a lesser impact on privacy interests.75
In Tom v. City and County of San Francisco,76 an ordinance preventing tenants-in-common from excluding other coowners from their individual dwellings was struck down under
this test. After pooling resources to acquire multi-unit residential property, the co-owners signed right-of-occupancy agreements specifying who would live in which unit. The court explained the effect of the ordinance, which had been passed to
discourage the conversion of rental housing to owner-occupied
housing: “[U]nrelated persons . . . would be required to share
occupancy of their dwelling units with each other, or could not
prevent other cotenants from entering their private living
space.”77 The court held that the city had articulated no interest
that justified “an extreme privacy violation, such as rendering
homeowners unable to determine the persons with whom they
should live, or forcing them to share their homes with others
who are unwelcome.”78
Fair housing laws that prohibit discriminatory roommate selection have a greater impact on privacy. The ordinance
struck down in Tom prevented the contractual protection of privacy, and thus tenants-in-common could theoretically have been
“forced to share their homes with others who [were] unwelcome.” But, as each co-owner was provided an individual
dwelling by mutual agreement, it was unlikely anyone would
actually invade another’s dwelling. However, fair housing laws
that require a roommate seeker to accept an applicant create
more than a theoretical burden. They force her to share her
home with someone “who [is] unwelcome.”79 As virtually any
alternative means of combating housing discrimination would
have a lesser impact on privacy, such laws are unlikely to be
upheld under California’s constitution.

IV. PROHIBITIONS ON DISCRIMINATORY
ADVERTISEMENTS
1. DISCRIMINATORY ADVERTISEMENTS AND FEDERAL
INTIMATE ASSOCIATION RIGHTS
The Supreme Court set a high bar for determining when
6

the right to intimate association has been violated, and federal
appeals courts have followed suit. Only laws that “directly and
substantially”80 interfere with the relationship have been struck
down, and laws creating significant burdens have been upheld
even in the context of marriage, a relationship that is in most
cases far more intimate than the relationships created between
roommates.81 Even when roommate seekers desire a close companion and not just someone to share the rent, advertising restrictions may require them to interview candidates whom they
are unlikely to choose, but in most cases, the prohibitions do not
prevent seekers from identifying suitable roommates and thus do
not violate intimate association rights.
In Zablocki v. Redhail,82 the touchstone case for the
“direct and substantial” interference standard, the Court reviewed a statute requiring parents with child support obligations
to obtain a court’s permission prior to remarriage. It held that
the law directly and substantially interfered with the fundamental right to marry, because it prevented people who could not
prove they could pay child support from remarrying.83 However, the Court made clear that laws only implicating the right to
marry would not face similar scrutiny: “[W]e do not mean to
suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way to
the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected
to rigorous scrutiny. [R]easonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with the decisions to enter into the marital
relationship may be legitimately imposed.”84 The Court found
no significant interference in Califano v. Jobst,85 concluding that
a Social Security Act provision terminating benefits for a dependent, disabled adult upon marriage to someone ineligible for
benefits did not directly and substantially interfere with the right
to marry.
The Court’s conclusions in Califano may have been
influenced by its determination that the government has greater
authority to attach conditions to recipients of its own benefits.
However, in Montgomery v. Carr,86 the Sixth Circuit directly
contrasted Zablocki and Califano without suggesting that a different standard applied in Califano because a government benefit was involved. Rather, the court explained “the directness and
the substantiality of the interference with the freedom to marry
distinguish[ed]” the two cases. It continued: “[w]hatever the
form of the government action involved . . . rational basis scrutiny will apply to the rationales offered by government defendants in cases presenting a claim that a plaintiff’s associational
right to marry has been infringed, unless the burden on the right
to marry is direct and substantial.”87
Furthermore, under the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions, the government may not require a beneficiary to surrender a constitutional right as a condition to receiving a benefit.88 The Supreme Court has been unpredictable in applying the
doctrine,89 and has almost universally rejected challenges related
to government welfare programs.90 But notably, in cases involving privacy in family relationships, the explanation as to why the
laws under review were not found impermissible has been that
the government’s condition either did not substantially deter the
exercise of the rights,91 or its action was not sufficiently direct.92
This analysis mirrors the direct and substantial interference test
discussed in Zablocki and applied in the lower courts.
Even presuming the threshold for direct and substantial
interference varies with the government’s role, nothing in the
case law suggests that requiring roommate seekers to interview
additional applicants rises to the level of an unconstitutional
burden. Although the advertising restrictions remove a tool for
THE MODERN AMERICAN

filtering out candidates whom roommate seekers are unlikely to
accept, they create no limitation on seekers’ ability to say yes or
no to any candidate and thus do not “significantly interfere” with
the right to enter into the relationship. Facial challenges succeed
only where a law is unconstitutional in all or nearly all of its
applications.93 In the few cases where a roommate seeker could
establish that the prohibitions actually prevented her from forming a roommate relationship,94 she could bring an as-applied
challenge. In most cases, the restrictions pass the “direct and
substantial interference” test and thus do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. DISCRIMINATORY ADVERTISEMENTS AND
OTHER FEDERAL PRIVACY RIGHTS

suitable applicants. However, it is unlikely that this would be
deemed a substantial limitation because the restrictions do not
limit whom a roommate seeker may consider or where she can
place her ads. They only require her to consider a broader group
of applicants than she might otherwise prefer, and ultimately she
controls the amount of time she dedicates to her search. Moreover, she maintains a great deal of control through her ad placement decisions. This is quite different from Carey, in which the
restrictions on how contraceptives could be distributed resulted
in a significant reduction in access not just to one’s choice of
contraceptive but to any contraceptives. Therefore, the restrictions on roommate ads are not unduly burdensome to the point
of violating the constitutional right to privacy.

3. DISCRIMINATORY ADS AND PRIVACY RIGHTS
Roommate seekers are unlikely to show that advertising
UNDER THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION
restrictions violate their privacy rights under the undue burden
standard that the Supreme Court has created in other privacy
Under California’s state privacy standard, a roommate
contexts: access to abortion or contraceptives. In Planned Par- seeker is unlikely to show that advertising prohibitions are an
enthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court held invasion of privacy. She must establish: “(1) a legally protected
that a twenty-four hour waiting period for abortions imposed a privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
‘particularly burdensome’ obstacle on women with the fewest circumstances; and (3) conduct by [the] defendant constituting a
resources, “those who must travel long distances, and those who serious invasion of privacy.”102 People have a privacy interest in
have difficulty explaining their whereabouts to husbands, em- selecting a roommate, but not a reasonable expectation of priployers, or others,”95 but that “[did] not demonstrate that the vacy “in the circumstances.” Because ads are a means of public
waiting period constitute[d] an undue burden.”96 Given this communication, it is logical that the interests of those who read
high bar, even if advertising restrictions require a person to in- ads, and not just those who place them, would be considered
when regulating content.
terview ten times as many
Furthermore, the restrictions on discriminatory
candidates in order to locate a
ads do not constitute a “serious invasion of
roommate, the burden they
privacy,” because in most cases, they do not
create is unlikely to be
actually prevent a roommate seeker from locatdeemed “undue,” particularly
because decisions involving People have a privacy interest in se- ing a suitable roommate, but merely require
him to interview additional candidates.103 It is
cohabitation are less fundalecting
a
roommate,
but
not
a
reamental than decisions involvin this third step that roommate advertising
sonable expectation of privacy “in differs from advertising for romantic partners.
ing reproduction.
The Court’s decision
Although such romantic partner ads are also a
the circumstances.”
in Carey v. Population Sermeans of public communication, people are
vices, International97 does
likely to have far more particularized criteria in
a greater number of areas when seeking
suggest that its standard for
mates.104 Advertising restrictions could subreviewing infringements on
privacy may sometimes be
stantially interfere with locating a compatible
lower than the abortion cases
companion due to the combination of characterindicate. The Court struck down a New York statute permitting istics sought. Moreover, there is typically a significantly higher
only licensed pharmacists to sell contraceptives, concluding that level of anxiety and fear of rejection105 involved with
it imposed a “significant burden” on the right to use contracep- “interviewing” potential lovers than there is with interviewing
tives.98 At first blush, it seems this law simply made it less con- potential roommates. Therefore, forcing those looking for love
venient for women to obtain contraceptives and was thus not so to “interview” many more applicants does constitute a much
dissimilar from the roommate advertising prohibitions. How- more serious invasion of privacy.
ever, the Court stated that although not a total ban, the law significantly reduced public access to contraceptives by increasing
4. DISCRIMINATORY ADS AND FREE SPEECH RIGHTS
costs and reducing privacy.99 In New York’s many small towns
The Supreme Court has explained that commercial
in 1977,100 where there may only have been one pharmacy, requiring an unmarried woman to interact with a pharmacist every speech may be distinguished “by its content”106 and has categotime she wanted to buy contraceptives could result in a decision rized speech that “inform[s] the public of the availability, nature,
to forgo the purchase entirely. In his concurring opinion, Justice and prices of products and services,”107 and speech in which the
Brennan emphasized that the law burdened the right to prevent speaker’s interests are “largely economic,” as commercial.108 It
conception “by substantially limiting access to the means of has further explained that the “diverse motives, means and meseffectuating that decision.”101
sages of advertising may make speech ‘commercial’ in widely
To some extent, advertising prohibitions “limit access varying degrees,” but that advertising “may be subject to reasonto the means” of finding a roommate, because searches become able regulation that serves a legitimate public interest.”109
more time-consuming and costly if people must interview un- Roommate ads apprise the public of the availability of rental
Special - Fall 2008
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housing, and although roommate relationships may be intimate, ity of property. Thus, the city was depriving its residents of
the ads placed by roommate seekers propose transactions that commercial speech rights enjoyed by virtually all other homebenefit them financially by reducing housing costs. Indeed, in owners. In contrast, prohibitions on discriminatory housing ads
are the norm, not the exception.
the cases discussed in Part II, multiple
Furthermore, unlike “For Sale” signs that, on
roommate seekers indicated that their
motives for seeking a roommate were It is not unlikely that people their face, send no stigmatizing message,
housing ads are per se harmfinancial.110 Moreover, offering shared
with racist attitudes live in discriminatory
ful and inflict an immediate harm on those
living space is not “inextricably intermore racially homogenous they degrade. In Florida Bar v. Went For It,
twined”111 with stating a roommate
Inc.,121 the Supreme Court upheld restrictions
seeker’s discriminatory criteria regarding
neighborhoods.
those with whom she wants to create an
prohibiting lawyers from soliciting personal
intimate association: As was discussed
injury or wrongful death clients within thirty
in Part IV.1, prohibitions on discriminatory ads rarely prevent a days of an accident under the Central Hudson test.122 It found
roommate seeker from locating a cohabitant.
the attorney ads offended their recipients and tarnished the repuRoommate ads should thus be evaluated as commercial tation of attorneys, and that the government has a substantial
speech, and their regulation evaluated under the four-part test interest in restricting speech that both creates an immediate harm
articulated in Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corporation v. and has a demonstrable detrimental effect on a particular group.
Public Services Commission of New York.112 First, the speech The Court distinguished its decision in Bolger v. Youngs Drugs
must concern lawful activity and must not be misleading. Sec- Products Corp., striking down a federal ban on direct-mail adond, the government must assert a substantial interest. Third, vertisements for contraceptives, on the grounds that the harm
the regulation must advance that interest, and fourth, it may not that the attorney solicitations caused could not be “eliminated by
be “more extensive than necessary.”113 This does not mean the a brief journey to the trash can.”123 Whereas contraceptive ads
absolute least restrictive means; rather, the government has a may offend some people, they did not substantially burden reburden of affirmatively establishing a “reasonable fit” between cipients who could simply dispose of them.
its interest and the speech restriction.114 If, as discussed in Part
Similar to the attorney solicitations in Florida Bar that
III, the right to choose cohabitants is constitutionally protected were likely to create “outrage and irritation”124 in their recipiunder federal intimate association or federal or state privacy ents, racially discriminatory ads are likely to have an analogous
rights, then discriminatory roommate ads describe lawful activ- immediate impact on those they degrade.125 And, just as the
ity and are not misleading. Because the first prong of Central Court found that disposing of the attorney solicitations did little
Hudson is satisfied in the roommate context, the government to combat the offense they generated, once a discriminatory ad
must show a substantial interest in barring the ads, and that the has been read, its harm is not easily undone.
restrictions advance the interest asserted without being more
Moreover, like the ads in Florida Bar, racially disextensive than necessary.
criminatory ads create a secondary harm by perpetuating racially
homogenous housing patterns. In United States v. Hunter,126 the
Fourth Circuit found a newspaper editor liable under 42 U.S.C. §
A. ADS THAT STATE PREFERENCES RELATED TO RACE, NA3604(c) for publishing a Mrs. Murphy’s ad for an apartment in a
TIONAL ORIGIN OR ANCESTRY
“white home.” The court explained how seeing significant numAchieving residential integration was one of Con- bers of such ads in one part of a city could deter non-whites
gress’s primary goals when the FHA was enacted in 1968.115 from seeking housing in those neighborhoods, even if other
Nearly forty years later, racially homogenous housing patterns dwellings were available in those areas on a non-discriminatory
continue to be a serious concern.116 Thus, the government con- basis.127 It further explained that prohibiting even exempt landtinues to have a substantial interest in preventing housing dis- lords from placing discriminatory ads served the FHA’s purpose
crimination based on race. Despite the fact that roommate seek- because wide circulation of statements of personal prejudice
ers may ultimately select whomever they wish as cohabitants, could magnify their negative effect.128 The wide distribution of
any racially discriminatory housing ads in public forums frus- roommate ads stating racially discriminatory preferences may
trate the integration of communities by stigmatizing minorities similarly deter applicants from applying for roommate situations
and creating animosity. Thus, as a means of combating racially in certain areas. It is not unlikely that people with racist attihomogenous housing patterns, a direct and concrete harm, ad- tudes live in more racially homogenous neighborhoods. If an
vertising prohibitions do advance the goals of the FHA and are a applicant sees multiple racially discriminatory roommate listings
means no more extensive than necessary to achieve those goals.
in a particular neighborhood, she may determine that it would be
Admittedly, the Supreme Court’s decision in Linmark wiser to seek housing elsewhere, thereby perpetuating the existAssociates, Inc. v. Willingboro117 reveals an unwillingness to ing housing pattern.
Further, racially discriminatory housing ads stigmatize
uphold laws enacted to promote integrated housing when the
burden on individual rights is too great.118 The Court struck minorities, frustrating the integration of communities. In his
down a ban on “For Sale” signs, despite a city’s contention that writings on racial stigma and African Americans, economist
promoting integration justified the ordinance because fear Glenn C. Loury describes two kinds of behavior: discrimination
among white homeowners that their property values would drop in contract (in the execution of formal transactions) and disas the town’s black population increased had caused “panic sell- crimination in contact (in the personal associations and relationing.”119 The Court sharply denounced the city’s restriction on ships created in the private spheres of life).129 Both have debilithe free flow of information.120 However, its decision must be tating consequences because the rules of contract and patterns of
considered in light of the type of restriction under review. “For contact control access to resources and social mobility.130
Sale” signs are a widely-used means of advertising the availabil- “Liberty and autonomy” would become meaningless if people
8
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could not discriminate when creating personal relationships, and nate could not publish discriminatory ads related to race, color,
thus discrimination in contact must remain a prerogative.131 religion, or national origin.141 The same arguments would apply
However, differential treatment of individuals in contract— regarding the number of Mrs. Murphy landlords that a minority
including housing—can be legitimately regulated because it boarder or renter would need to meet in order to create a
significantly contributes to racial inequality and stigma.132
“match” and locate housing in a predominantly white neighborA 2000 study measuring preferences among various hood, but Congress determined that the advertising restrictions
ethnic groups in Los Angeles illustrates the effects of racial were a necessary tool in achieving its integration goals.
The last prong of the Central Hudson test is thus satisstigma on housing.133 Subjects were asked to imagine the racial
mix of a neighborhood in which they would feel most comfort- fied. Although roommate seekers cannot ultimately be forced to
able. Forty percent of Asians, thirty-two percents of Latinos, live with someone against their will, because racially discriminaand nineteen percent of whites envisioned neighborhoods with tory ads stigmatize minority groups in a manner that frustrates
no African Americans, and immigrants were more likely to ex- integrated housing goals, eliminating such ads from widely acclude African Americans.134 This suggests that new arrivals to cessed public media is a means no more extensive than necesAmerica are taught that African Americans are a group to be sary to further the government’s interest in promoting integrated
avoided.135 Because discriminatory housing ads are widely cir- neighborhoods. Thus, as long as Central Hudson remains the
culated, they are likely to contribute to this stigmatization, even controlling test for commercial speech,142 roommate ads that
in cases in which the underlying discrimination is legal. Restric- discriminate on the basis of race, ancestry or national origin may
tions on roommate ads are not simply a case of the government be prohibited.
restricting speech in order to combat the spread of beliefs with
which it disagrees. Rather, it is regulating housing-related comB. ADS THAT STATE PREFERENCES RELATED
mercial speech to counteract a concrete housing-related harm.
TO OTHER PROTECTED CATEGORIES
The government’s substantial interest in promoting integration
thus meets the third prong of the Central Hudson test.
It is less clear that barring other types of discriminatory
One might argue that prohibiting discriminatory ads ads, like those expressing preferences based on sexualactually contributes to racially homogenous housing patterns orientation or religious practice,143 passes the Central Hudson
because allowing people to
test. The government has a substantial intercandidly state preferences
est in assuring that all citizens have equal
may encourage minorities to while preventing confusion may be a access to housing, but because roommate
seek housing where they oth- substantial government interest, it can seekers can ultimately choose their cohabierwise might not.136 If stattants, preventing them from advertising their
ing preferences is legal, mi- likely be achieved without a total ban. preferences does not make any additional
housing available to those with whom they
nority applicants may assume
that those who do not state such preferences would welcome prefer not to live. Whereas the FHA’s legislative history is rethem.137 To the contrary, if stating preferences is prohibited and plete with discussions regarding the need to racially integrate
in a predominantly white neighborhood half the roommate seek- housing,144 its history does not suggest that lawmakers were
ers are open to minority applicants and half are not, to create a concerned with integrating housing along other than racial
“match,” a minority applicant would have to visit twice as many lines.145 Thus, prohibiting ads stating preferences unrelated to
apartments in that neighborhood.138 The applicant may not have race does not serve the independent legislative objective of inteformal knowledge of those statistics, but over time and talking to gration. These ads do risk creating psychological injury and
others, she may come to suspect it and decide to avoid the white stigma, but the Supreme Court has held that the government may
neighborhood, thereby reinforcing the existing housing pat- not restrict speech only to prevent such harms. Its decision in
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,146 striking down an ordinance that
tern.139
While this model is plausible, the “ifs” are significant. made it a misdemeanor to use inflammatory symbols to knowIf the percentage of roommate seekers in the white neighbor- ingly arouse “anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis
hood who welcome minority applicants is more like 80% or of race, color, creed, religion or gender,” illustrates that a more
90%, the number of homes that the applicant would need to visit tangible interest is required to overcome a First Amendment
in order to create a “match” drops considerably, and the stigma- challenge. Racially discriminatory ads are unique because they
tizing effects of discriminatory ads in widely circulated media frustrate the integration of neighborhoods.
may reinforce existing housing patterns more than prohibitions
A second reason for applying advertising restrictions to
do. While it is plausible that if discriminatory ads are allowed, Mrs. Murphy landlords, and to roommate seekers, is that these
the absence of a stated preference may be turned into a positive, ads could create a false impression that housing discrimination is
the opposite is equally plausible. Seeing some racist ads may legal.147 People may see ads placed by individuals who are
create the impression that prejudice is more widespread than it uniquely allowed to discriminate, and mistakenly believe that
actually is. Applicants might assume that many more people are any landlord may do so.148 But, while preventing confusion may
racists—particularly people who live in areas with a dispropor- be a substantial government interest, it can likely be achieved
tionate number of discriminatory ads—but do not want to admit without a total ban. Such a ban would be “more extensive than
their prejudices in print.
necessary” because a policy to educate would suffice: DisclaimWhere there are conflicting factual theories, legislatures ers explaining that housing discrimination is illegal outside the
have latitude in shaping policy. In commercial speech and other roommate context could be mandated in any ad stating a disFirst Amendment contexts, the Supreme Court has often de- criminatory preference.149 Restrictions that create a total ban on
ferred to legislative judgments.140 When the FHA was enacted, discriminatory ads unrelated to race, national origin, or ancestry
Congress decided that even those who are allowed to discrimi- therefore likely fail the fourth step of Central Hudson.
Special - Fall 2008
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c. ADS THAT USE RELIGION AS A PROXY FOR ETHNICITY

stem from religious beliefs.158 Because religious practice can
overlap with the organization of a household, locating cohabitants who share their faith and practices may be uniquely important for devout roommate seekers. When there are few fellow
practitioners in the communities where religious individuals
live, the advertising restrictions may make it extremely difficult
for devout roommate seekers to locate suitable cohabitants.
Several provisions in existing legal doctrine may provide additional grounds for as-applied challenges in these cases.

The difficult area is when race, national origin and ancestry categories overlap with religion. In Saint Francis College
v. Al-Khazraji, Justice Brennan explained “the line between discrimination based on ancestry or ethnic characteristics [] and
discrimination based on place or nation of ... origin, [] is not a
bright one.” 150 Similarly, for members of some religious
groups, like Muslims, Jews, Sikhs and Hindus, membership in
the religious group is equated with an ethnic distinction, not
simply a distinction based on belief. And, the Civil Rights Act
a. RFRAS AND PROTECTIONS UNDER RELIGIOUS
of 1866151 created protection for Jews against racial discriminaEXERCISE CLAUSES
tion—protection that remains intact.152 Thus, religious preferLiving with an individual of another faith could seriences in roommate ads must not be used as a means to skirt the
prohibitions on discriminatory ads related to race, national ori- ously burden the religious exercise of some roommate seekers.
gin, or ancestry. The intense discrimination faced by people An Orthodox Jew who maintains a kosher kitchen may be conidentified with Islam since September 11, 2001153 could eventu- cerned that a roommate who does not share her devotion would
ally drive them into segregated enclaves. And, although some compromise her practice—perhaps by eating meat on a plate
may argue that antireligious statements are too tangential to the restricted to dairy.159 Some Hindus may believe that living with
government’s interest in promoting integration to fall within the an individual who is not a member of their caste jeopardizes
“substantial interest,” all groups who could face discrimination their reincarnation.160 Restrictions on birthday and holiday celeon the basis of race must be treated equally in this context. In brations could make cohabitation with people of other faiths a
Regents of University of California v. Bakke, the Supreme Court serious burden for a Jehovah’s Witness.161 In towns or cities
explicitly rejected the idea that judges are equipped to draw lines with large populations of people practicing their faiths, these
as to which groups deserve protection against such discrimina- roommate seekers could probably locate roommates by placing
tion.154 Although discrimination against certain ethnic groups non-discriminatory ads in places where fellow practitioners conmay have more harmful effects in various circumstances, all are gregate.162 However, when roommate seekers are part of a small
to be afforded equal protection.
minority, the restrictions may prevent them from finding a suitHow then to discern the prohibable cohabitant and therefore pose a
ited religion-as-ethnicity ads from the
serious burden, particularly if they
permissible religion-as-belief ads? Ads
cannot afford to live alone.
that describe the religious practices that
The Supreme Court’s deciroommate seekers perform within the individuals whose national origin or sion in Employment Division, Dehome—like keeping kosher, prohibiting ethnic group is identified with a par- partment of Human Resources of
alcohol for religious reasons, studying
Oregon v. Smith163 created an obstaticular
religion
would
be
granted
the bible, or praying, would suggest that
cle for such roommate seekers to
the roommate seeker’s preference for a special rights to discriminate: a re- invoke the free exercise clause of
roommate of a particular religion is rethe First Amendment as a defense to
lated to her belief system: she is not sim- sult that would probably not survive fair housing laws. The Court conan equal protection challenge.
ply using religion as a proxy for ethniccluded that the clause does not apply
ity. Under this approach, an ad that
to statutes of general applicability
states “no Jews” or “no Muslims” or “no
that are not directed at religious
Hindus” would be prohibited. However,
practice. However, Congress rea religious roommate seeker looking for
sponded by passing the Religious
a roommate who keeps kosher or observes Ramadan155 could Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA),164 exempting indistate so in her ad. Ads that state “no fundamentalists” or “no viduals from generally applicable laws that substantially burden
Atheists” would also be permissible, because they focus on reli- their exercise of religion, unless the government shows the law
gious ideology and not ethnicity. The tougher case would be ads is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governthat read “no Catholics” or “no Protestants” or “no Christians,” ment interest. Twelve states have since enacted state RFRAs.165
as these religions are not identified with a particular race or an- The Supreme Court later held that the federal RFRA could not
cestry. However, they should nonetheless be prohibited. Other- constitutionally restrict state laws,166 but RFRA’s application to
wise, individuals whose national origin or ethnic group is identi- federal laws continues,167 and state RFRAs continue to apply to
fied with a particular religion would be granted special rights to state laws. Furthermore, many states apply a compelling interest
discriminate: a result that would probably not survive an equal test similar to the Sherbert-Yoder168 test for infringements on
protection challenge.156
free exercise rights granted by their state constitutions.169
State RFRAs or state religious free exercise constitutional provisions are a possible source of protection for devout
5. ADDITIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR ADVERTISEMENTS
roommate seekers whose religious practice is substantially burTHAT STATE RELIGIOUS PREFERENCES
dened by the advertising prohibitions. Religious landlords
Homogeneity of tastes, attitudes and orientations help whose beliefs would be compromised by renting to unmarried
create a successful living arrangement,157 especially when they cohabitants have sought protection under these provisions. The
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law remains largely unsettled, but some courts have found merit
in the landlords’ claims.170 The California Supreme Court declined to uphold such a landlord’s free exercise rights in Smith v.
Fair Housing and Employment Commission (Evelyn Smith),171
but the factors outlined by the court suggest that a burdened
roommate seeker could be protected under a RFRA: 172
(1) The burden must fall on a religious
belief rather than a philosophy or a way of
life. (2) The burdened religious belief
must be sincerely held. (3) The plaintiff
must prove the burden is substantial or, in
other words, legally significant. (4) If all
the foregoing are true, the government
must demonstrate that application of the
burden to the person is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and is
the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling government interest.173
Religious roommate seekers likely meet each of the four parts of
this test: (1) The housing laws burden religious belief (2) that is
sincerely held; (3) the burden is substantial because the laws
prevent the devout seeker from locating a roommate who will
not interfere with her religious practice; and (4) as described in
Part IV.4.b, the government is unlikely to demonstrate that prohibiting ads unrelated to race is a means no more extensive than
necessary of furthering a compelling state interest. In theory,174
the least restrictive means standard creates an even higher burden on the government.175 Roommate seekers whose free exercise of religion would be burdened if they were unable to locate
a cohabitant would virtually always be describing their religious
practices (like dietary restrictions, observing the Sabbath, or
barring alcohol within their dwelling) in their advertisements.
Therefore, the preferences would describe religion in terms of
belief, and not as a stigmatizing proxy for ethnicity.176 Thus,
prohibitions on these advertisements would not survive even
intermediate scrutiny.177
Nonetheless, to raise a RFRA defense, unless a roommate seeker lives in a jurisdiction recognizing an affirmative
right to have a roommate, she would need to show that she actually could not afford to live alone – not merely that living alone
costs more. The Evelyn Smith court explained: “an incidental
burden on religious exercise is not substantial if it can be described as simply making religious exercise more expensive.”178
Given the large number of renters for whom housing costs are
categorized as “severe cost burdens,”179 some roommate seekers
are likely to make this showing. Perhaps some could find less
desirable housing that required a longer commute or was located
in a more dangerous part of town, but denying a renter safe, convenient housing may indeed be held a substantial burden on her
religious practice. Thus, RFRAs or state free exercise clauses
interpreted to follow Sherbert and Yoder may provide some religious roommate seekers with a defense to generally applicable
fair housing laws.
B.

ate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social,
economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.”180 Even
when a challenged action is not specifically directed to the freedom of association for free speech purposes, strict scrutiny is
applied to infringements on that right.181 To come within First
Amendment protection, a group must engage in some form of
public or private expression.182 The association’s aim need not
be disseminating a certain message or expressing its views to the
public.183 Expression within the community suffices; the association need only engage in expressive activity “that could be
impaired in order to be entitled to protection.”184
Roommate seekers attempting to create an association
for the purpose of communal prayer or bible study would likely
be afforded “traditional First Amendment”185 protection: “We
are three Christian females . . . . We have weekly bible studies
and bi-weekly times of fellowship.”186 As only a small subset of
people who respond to roommate ads would be interested in
such a relationship, prohibiting these roommate seekers from
advertising specific religious practices could substantially interfere with their ability to identify applicants.187 As discussed, the
government is unlikely to demonstrate a compelling state interest that justifies prohibitions on roommate ads stating preferences unrelated to race even under the less rigorous “no more
extensive than necessary” standard.188 The Supreme Court has
rejected the suppression of speech that impairs an association’s
expressive message on First Amendment grounds.189 By preventing the creation of the association, restrictions that prevent a
roommate seeker from identifying a co-worshipper create just as
great an injury to the right of expressive association.190

V. PROHIBITIONS ON DISCRIMINATORY STATEMENTS
The FHA’s prohibitions on discriminatory statements
make illegal any statement “that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination” or indicates “an intention to make any
such preference, limitation, or discrimination,” if based on a
protected characteristic.191 Courts have consistently interpreted
“indicates” to mean indicates “to an ordinary reader” or “to an
ordinary listener,” regardless of the speaker’s actual intent.192
Thus, roommate seekers who make statements or ask questions
that “an ordinary listener” interprets as indicating an intention to
make a preference related to a protected characteristic could be
held liable under § 3604(c). Phrases as seemingly innocuous as
“religious landmark” or “retired,” and even the word
“integrated” are potential sources of liability.193 Inquiries about
issues like religion194 or, in jurisdictions where it is protected,
sexual orientation, are prohibited. A roommate seeker could be
found in violation of the law for describing her own religious
practices or sexual orientation, if it would seem to “an ordinary
listener” that the statements indicate a discriminatory preference.
The restrictions thus effectively create a category of taboo subjects that people who are considering living together may not
discuss without risking liability.
1. INTIMATE ASSOCIATION AND PRIVACY RIGHTS AND
DISCRIMINATORY STATEMENTS

RIGHTS TO EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION

In some cases, roommate seekers are looking for people
with whom they can build a religious community for purposes of
expressive association. In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, the
Supreme Court reaffirmed the First Amendment right “to associSpecial - Fall 2008

Limiting the subjects that potential cohabitants can
discuss may substantially burden roommate seekers’ ability to
create successful roommate relationships and to feel comfortable
in their homes. For example, the restrictions could adversely
affect an Orthodox Jew who observes Shabbat195 and must as11

certain that her future roommate will not interfere with her practice. So too for the devout Muslim who prays in the living room
2. FREE SPEECH RIGHTS AND
– the only room in the apartment with an Eastward facing winSTATEMENT PROHIBITIONS
dow – several times a day, or the Evangelical Christian who
Prohibitions on discriminatory statements unrelated to
holds weekly bible studies around the kitchen table. These individuals would want to confirm that a roommate will not inter- race, national origin or ancestry do not require new analysis.
rupt their worship by turning on a television or stereo in their Even if statements made during the interview process are concommon space while they are deep in prayer or study. Disclo- sidered commercial speech, prohibitions on such statements fail
sure of these practices also serves applicants’ interests. An ap- the Central Hudson test just as prohibitions on parallel adverplicant who wants to watch Oprah may be annoyed if her room- tisements fail because the government is unlikely to establish
mate commandeers the living room for prayer, just as an appli- that such restrictions are no more extensive then necessary to
cant who does not participate in bible study may resent lost ac- further a substantial government interest.
However, prohibitions on discriminatory statements
cess to her kitchen each week. Because it is likely that tensions
would later arise as a result of these undisclosed competing de- related to race, national origin or ancestry require a fresh look.
sires, a devout roommate seeker could be significantly burdened The government maintains its interest in integration, but stateif unable to discuss her religious practice with a potential co- ments made in private are unlikely to undermine this objective
habitant. The statement prohibitions thus directly and substan- and contribute to the stigmatization of minority groups to the
extent that widely circulated ads do. The
tially prevent her from establishing
risk remains that individuals subjected to
a workable roommate relationship,
and therefore violate her intimate a devout roommate seeker could be offensive statements may no longer consider a roommate of another race200 or
association rights.
significantly
burdened
if
unable
to
Privacy rights are similarly
may restrict their search to neighborinfringed. If an evangelical Chris- discuss her religious practice with a hoods primarily inhabited by members
tian who truly believes that homoof their own race. Nonetheless, statepotential cohabitant.
sexuality is a sin winds up with a
ments made in private will not be seen
lesbian roommate because she was
by potentially thousands of people and
unable to determine an applicant’s orientation prospectively, thus do not contribute to the stigmatization of minority groups in
greeting her roommate’s lover in the bathroom several mornings the way that widely distributed advertisements do. Because the
a week may make her acutely aware that behavior that violates connection to the government’s integration objectives is more
her belief system is occurring within her home. The result may tenuous, these prohibitions may not pass even the intermediate
be feelings of alienation in “the one retreat to which men and scrutiny applied to restrictions on commercial speech.
women [are supposed to be able to] repair to escape the tribulaFurthermore, whether these statements should even be
tions of their daily pursuits.”196 If an individual cannot exercise classified as commercial speech is less clear. Once prospective
enough control over the composition of her household to create cohabitants are identified and roommate seekers and applicants
an environment in which she feels at ease, the right to privacy are determining whether they will be compatible, their dialogue
seems little more than a platitude. Therefore, under such cir- may be considered speech afforded full First Amendment procumstances, statement prohibitions would likely violate the test tection and restrictions upon it subjected to strict scrutiny. This
outlined in Carey v. Population Services, International. Just as dialogue cannot be characterized as an advertisement, and allimiting the distribution of contraceptives to licensed pharma- though it relates to a commercial transaction—the rental of
cists “burden[ed] an individual’s right to decide to prevent con- housing for financial gain—the Supreme Court has explained
ception or terminate pregnancy by substantially limiting access that speech does not retain its commercial character “when it is
to the means of effectuating that decision,”197 statement prohibi- inextricably intertwined with otherwise protected speech.”201
tions that prevent a roommate seeker from talking about critical Because locating suitable applicants does not require the vast
aspects of her personal life or from asking a candidate about majority of roommate seekers to include discriminatory prefermatters of great importance to her, substantially limit her ability ences when they are placing ads, such statements are not
to effectively select future roommates.
“inextricable” in the advertising context. But, there is nothing
Unlike advertising prohibitions, statement prohibitions commercial about a roommate seeker explaining that she wants
actually prevent a roommate seeker from finding a compatible a roommate who will join her in communal prayer, and she is
cohabitant. That is, a roommate seeker who is religious, has unlikely to find such a cohabitant if unable to discuss religion
strong feelings about homosexuality or politics,198 or cares about when interviewing applicants. As it cannot be extracted from
national origin or race but cannot discern an applicant’s ancestry the speech related to the commercial transaction, this speech
by looking at her, would be unable to find a suitable cohabitant. should retain its full First Amendment protections.
Therefore, the government cannot regulate the stateUnlike advertising prohibitions, which increase the size of the
applicant pool that a roommate seeker must consider, but do not ments made when roommate seekers interview applicants, at
“directly and substantially” interfere with the right to form an least those related to determining compatibility. Outside the
intimate association or unduly burden privacy, statement prohi- commercial speech realm, “content-based restrictions are susbitions may make it impossible for a roommate seeker to deter- tained only in the most extraordinary circumstances: ‘The First
mine that an applicant is someone with whom she wants to form Amendment forbids the government from regulating speech in
an intimate association—someone to whom she will reveal her ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of oth“backstage” self.199 Thus, they do “directly and substantially” ers.’”202 In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,203 the Court concluded that
interfere with her right to intimate association and create an prohibiting the use of inflammatory symbols was unconstitu“undue burden” on her privacy rights.
tional despite its “belief that burning a cross in someone’s front
12
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yard [was] reprehensible.”204 Unless the government can show
that prohibitions on discriminatory statements made when roommate seekers are interviewing applicants serve a compelling
interest—apart from protecting applicants from exposure to reprehensible ideas205—the restrictions also violate the First
Amendment.
A determination that the government can prohibit racially discriminatory ads, but not statements between individuals, risks a counterproductive result. Roommate applicants who
respond to non-discriminatory ads could then be subjected to
offensive statements in a more inimical form, such as those spoken to them directly. However, scholars analyzing prejudice and
discrimination in cyberspace suggest that because explicit expressions of prejudice have become taboo, people are significantly less likely to explicitly deny someone a resource or service based on discriminatory criteria when interacting with another person in real time.206 Rather, they will find a non-explicit
excuse for behaving discriminatorily.207
Prejudice is more likely to be overtly expressed on the
Internet because of the anonymous and disinhibited nature of the
forum,208 where people feel free to express themselves in less
self-conscious and less socially desirable ways.209 One example
of this phenomenon is cyberbullying. As explained by a teenager whose friend committed suicide after being harassed by his
classmates on-line, “You wouldn’t do that to someone’s face,
but on-line it’s completely different. You can do whatever you
want and no one can do anything—you’re at your house they’re
at their house—it’s different.”210
Roommate seekers are more likely to be discreet when
dealing with applicants in person than when placing Internet or
classified ads. In most of the cases discussed in Part II, the
roommate seekers rarely spoke of their own prejudices to the
complainants; rather, they either claimed that another roommate
had a problem with the candidate, made the statement to a third
party, or otherwise diffused their remarks. In Larrick, the defendant told the applicant that her other roommate did not want to
live with a black person.211 In Baker, the respondent explained,
via voicemail, that it was his fundamentalist Christian roommate
with whom the lesbian applicant “would not get along.” 212 In
DeSantis, the respondent told the white tester that she was afraid
of black men. 213 In Marya v. Slakey, the roommate who rejected the applicant did not make per se insulting remarks about
Indians, instead claiming that he feared a third Indian roommate
would create an environment dominated by a single culture.214
While the statements made in each case vary in degree of offensiveness, the speakers were somewhat sheepish about making
them. They may have made more overtlyprejudiced statements
in an anonymous advertisement. Thus, prohibiting discrimina-

tory ads, even while permitting discriminatory statements, may
indeed shield applicants from the most pernicious speech.

VI. CONCLUSION
Whether it is for months or years, an individual’s
choice to allow someone to share her living space is a private
decision. The government cannot interfere with the individual’s
ultimate selection without violating her Fourteenth Amendment
rights. This is no less true when an individual takes a roommate
in order to defray housing costs. A conclusion to the contrary
would mean that those with fewer resources have lesser rights to
intimate association and privacy. Such an outcome runs counter
to the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Zablocki v. Redhail215 that
people may not be deprived of their fundamental rights of association simply because they are poor.
The more information that a roommate seeker can place
in an advertisement—about herself and about what she desires in
a roommate—the less time she will spend interviewing unsuitable candidates. Descriptive ads also save applicants the time
and energy they would otherwise expend contacting people who
are unlikely to accept them. Therefore, both sides benefit when
roommate seekers are granted more leeway in advertising their
preferences. Nonetheless, there is a tipping point at which the
harm that an advertised preference causes outweighs the benefits
of targeted advertising. By stigmatizing minority groups, racially discriminatory ads perpetuate racially homogenous housing patterns and the resulting social harms. Although ultimately
a roommate seeker can rely on any characteristic in choosing a
cohabitant, saving some time is not worth the damage caused by
racially discriminatory ads. Furthermore, unlike preferences
motivated by practical or religious concerns, like keeping a kosher kitchen, because preferences related to race are often motivated by fear of the unknown, intergroup contact during an interview may cause some roommate seekers to reevaluate their
prejudices.216
Fair housing laws should thus balance these competing
interests. I urge legislatures to recognize the intimate association and privacy concerns that roommate seekers face when
choosing those with whom they will negotiate taking out the
garbage, cleaning the bathtub, and whether to set up a Christmas
tree in the living room. Because these issues are not encountered by either traditional or most Mrs. Murphy landlords, fair
housing laws should be amended to address the special considerations of roommate seekers, but the integration goals of the
FHA should not be sacrificed.

The Modern American is available on
the Westlaw, LexisNexis, and V.lex databases.
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